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Chapter 5 
Welfare: Contesting Communities of Solidarity 
Nicola McEwen 
 
The defence of a social democratic vision of welfare was a key issue in the independence 
referendum campaign, just as it had been in the devolution referendum 17 years earlier. For the 
Yes camp, independence promised the power to create a more equal society and a fairer, more 
progressive welfare state, built upon Scottish social solidarity and the ‘common weal’.  
Promises included protecting and expanding pensions and benefits and abolishing the ‘bedroom 
tax’, halting welfare retrenchment and some other aspects of UK welfare reform, defending the 
NHS, and building a more Nordic-style welfare state reflecting the solidarity and social values 
(assumed to be) shared by Scots. For its part, the No campaign questioned the financial ability 
of an independent Scotland to afford current levels of spending on pensions, benefits, health and 
social care, let alone build a more generous system. No campaigners stressed that the UK’s 
‘broad shoulders’ meant that resources could be pooled and burdens shared. The Labour Party 
appealed to a conception of social solidarity that crossed the internal territorial boundaries of the 
UK. It championed the UK ‘social union’ as the essence of its political union, reflecting and 
reinforcing UK-wide solidarity and mutual belonging. These competing claims and aspirations 
were set against the backdrop of controversial UK welfare reforms and a state-driven narrative 
that presented welfare as an unsustainable burden rather than a source of collective solidarity 
and pride. This weakened Labour’s arguments about social union and gave the Yes side the 
opportunity to present independence as the best way to preserve the social and economic 
entitlements associated with the post-war welfare state. 
At the heart of these debates lies the interplay between policy choices, identity politics and 
contested communities of solidarity. The territorial politics of welfare is a common feature of 
nation-building and nationalist mobilization across advanced democratic nations and states. This 
chapter contextualizes and evaluates the competing welfare claims made by both sides in the 
independence referendum campaign. It first explores the relationship between territorial politics 
and the welfare state, arguing that the nation-building role once played by UK welfare has been 
undermined by both the transfer of competences over key welfare institutions and services to the 
devolved institutions, and the retreat from state welfare at the centre. Second, it identifies the 
key protagonists in the welfare debate. Drawing on a range of documentary sources from the 
long referendum campaign, including campaign documents, archived website material, 
government documents, speeches, news articles and online footage, it then analyses the core 
dimensions of the referendum welfare debate. The key analytical device is that of ‘frames’, 
defined by Gitlin (1980: 6) as ‘principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of 
little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters’. In political 
communication and campaigning, frames help to interpret and lend meaning to policy and 
political challenges, and to guide and motivate political behaviour (Entman, 1993; Hallahan, 
2011). In the context of the referendum, framing helps us to identify how political actors 
perceived and represented the key issues on welfare, raising its salience in campaign discourse. 
The chapter draws upon Benford and Snow’s threefold categorization of framing to elucidate the 
ways in which different constitutional options were invoked to present the diagnosis and 
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prognosis for the future of the welfare state, and to motivate supporters and shape vote choice 
(Benford and Snow 2000).   
 The terms ‘welfare’ and ‘welfare state’ require clarification. For some, welfare may be a 
general set of social programmes delivered by the state, and the term is sometimes used in a 
derogatory way to refer to a narrow set of social security benefits, largely for people outside of 
the labour market. The broader definition used in this chapter conceptualizes the welfare state as 
a kind of statehood – ‘a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through politics 
and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces’ (Briggs, 2000; Wincott, 
2003). In this sense, ‘welfare’ captures the broad range of social services, institutions, transfers 
and entitlements provided to individual citizens to protect them against social and economic 
contingencies, for example, related to age, ill health, unemployment or low pay, and to promote 
their social, educational and economic development and well-being. It includes institutions like 
the National Health Service, specific policy programmes and provisions for social housing, 
schooling, education, social and health care, as well as benefits and tax credits provided through 
the social security and tax system. The welfare debate in the referendum campaign also invoked 
a societal vision – of the kind of country the UK is and had become, and the kind of country an 
independent Scotland could be.  
The Welfare State and the Nation-State 
Historically, the development of the welfare state and the nation state went hand in hand. The 
expanded role of the state in providing for the day-to-day needs of its citizens helped to 
reinforce its legitimacy among those it governed and justified the levying of taxes on the 
population. The national symbolism that accompanied such interventions strengthened the 
perception that the state represented a community of mutual belonging (Rokkan and Urwin, 
1983; Mishra, 1999). Depending on the nature of the welfare regime, welfare states could 
generate social solidarity and mutual belonging across class groups, conferring an equality of 
status and set of entitlements on citizens irrespective of their market value and reinforcing that 
the better off had obligations towards their poorer compatriots (Marshall, 1950; Titmuss, 1958). 
 Intentionally or otherwise, welfare state institutions and services also served the politics of 
nation-building in plurinational states where the boundaries of national communities are 
contested. The nation-building function of the welfare state may be both symbolic and 
instrumental. Symbolically, welfare institutions can provide an institutional focus for national 
solidarity, representing a symbol of mutual belonging, risk-sharing and common security. It was 
not by accident that UK welfare developed a National Health Service and a system of national 
insurance, contributing to what Billig (1995) referred to as the ‘unmindful reminders’ of the 
boundaries of nationhood that are subtly presented and represented in every day discourse and 
experience. More instrumentally, the welfare state may serve a nation-building purpose by 
protecting citizens against risk and providing for their social and economic security, as well as 
focusing political organization and mobilization towards the institutions of state. A state that 
provides social protection for its citizens may also secure their loyalty, strengthening the ties 
that bind and heightening the risks associated with changing the constitutional order (McEwen, 
2006: 62-79; Banting, 1995; Béland and Lecours, 2008).  
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 In the UK and elsewhere, the relationship between the welfare state and the nation-state has 
faced two key challenges in recent years: the development and expansion of multi-level 
government; and a retreat from state welfare in the face of ideological pressures and growing 
financial and demographic burdens. First, in multi-level states where political authority is 
dispersed across levels of government, often there isn’t a national welfare system at all, but 
variations on social welfare provision across the internal units of the state (McEwen and 
Moreno, 2005). The development of distinctive policies, social programmes and entitlements for 
citizens of the same state depending on the region in which they live poses a challenge to the 
principle of social citizenship and the equality of status for all citizens, potentially undermining 
inter-regional solidarity ties.  
 The regionalization of welfare can, of course, boost welfare state development at the 
regional scale, and lead to the development of systems of welfare that are more responsive to 
regional needs and preferences. The state need not be the only appropriate level of social 
citizenship (Keating, 2009: 504-6). In multinational states, sub-state nationalist and regionalist 
party governments have exploited the opportunity to use their command of social welfare to try 
to shift loyalties away from central institutions and to reinforce the boundaries of the national 
communities in whose name their territorial claims are made (McEwen, 2006; Béland and 
Lecours, 2008; Vampa, 2014). Where the welfare state becomes a tool deployed in the 
competitive nation-building strategies of state and regional governments, it can ‘ratchet up’ 
social welfare provision as each level of government competes for recognition in similar policy 
spheres (James and Lusztig, 2002; Banting, 2005; Allen, 2012).   
 The second challenge to the nation-building potential of welfare comes in the form of 
welfare retrenchment. In some countries, this may be ideologically driven, rooted in a neoliberal 
desire to escape a perceived dependency culture, an over-burdened and overly interfering state, 
and to promote enterprise and individual responsibility. For many, it is a response to increased 
levels of social expenditure across advanced democratic states, faced with ageing populations, 
low fertility and, consequently, less favourable dependency ratios between non-workers in need 
of care and tax-paying workers with the ability to fund it. This is often compounded by a belief 
that citizens are less willing to pay higher taxes for redistributive welfare (Bonoli, 2000). 
Welfare retrenchment, where it occurs, undermines the extent to which state-wide welfare 
institutions can represent symbols of inter-regional and class solidarity. It may also undermine 
perceptions that the state can act as the guarantor of citizens’ social rights and entitlements. As a 
consequence, attachment to the nation-state may weaken, as may the risks and potential losses 
associated with major constitutional change. Sub-state nationalist or regionalist parties who 
demand greater self-government or independence for their territorial communities have 
exploited state welfare retrenchment, developing a narrative which questions the willingness and 
ability of the existing state to meet social and economic need, and promises a better future in the 
wake of territorial self-government. In the 1995 Quebec sovereignty referendum, for example, 
the Yes campaign exploited federal government cuts to unemployment insurance, pensions, old 
age security and transfer payments to the provinces, which they contrasted to the social 
democratic projet de société associated with a sovereign Quebec (McEwen, 2006; Béland and 
Lecours, 2008). Similarly, in the 1980s and 1990s, the welfare retrenchment of the 
Thatcher/Major governments was used by advocates of Scottish self-government to reinforce the 
need for a Scottish Parliament – to protect public services, develop ‘Scottish solutions to 
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Scottish problems’, and to guard against the regressive policies of a right-wing government 
(McEwen, 2006). Ideological, demographic and political pressures on the welfare state may of 
course be evident equally at the regional scale of government as at the centre. Where welfare 
competences are shared, these pressures can generate both burden-shifting and blame-shifting 
between levels of government. 
 The Scottish independence referendum was set against a backdrop of these twin challenges. 
The once broadly integrated UK welfare state has given way to divergent systems of welfare as 
a result of devolution, while the one remaining area of welfare – social security – that remained 
the responsibility of the UK government was being reshaped and partially eroded by 
controversial welfare reforms.  
 The Scotland Act 1998 transferred significant areas of the welfare state to the Scottish 
Parliament, and has allowed divergence in the substance and delivery of social services, with a 
greater preference toward universality and public provision in Scotland as compared to England. 
The most visible areas of distinctive social policy – ‘free personal care’, the abolition of tuition 
fees, free prescriptions, free bus travel for pensioners – assumed a symbolic significance in 
underpinning devolved Scotland’s distinctiveness within the union. Although the UK welfare 
state always entailed variation between and within the UK’s four nations, alongside many other 
inequalities in access to service provision (Wincott, 2006), devolution has rendered territorial 
variations more visible, and created the structures to facilitate the growth of distinctive welfare 
regimes. Social entitlements across many areas of provision now vary according to the territorial 
community in which UK citizens live, generating concerns among some academics on the 
liberal left that the absence of national, UK-wide frameworks may weaken inter-regional 
solidarity and social citizenship (Hazell and O’Leary, 1999; Jeffery, 2002: 193-4).  
 However, the reservation of social security and most tax policies meant that the capacity to 
shape redistributive welfare remained principally with the UK government and parliament, 
while a good deal of interdependence between devolved and reserved competencies created 
jagged edges in social provision, for example, between housing and housing benefit, or social 
care and disability benefits. Thus, UK welfare reforms intended to simplify the social security 
system, to reduce the financial burden social welfare imposed on the state and to promote 
(through cuts and curtailing entitlements) an ideologically driven transition from welfare to 
work for working-age adults, had direct and indirect consequences for devolved welfare 
competence. UK welfare reform also led to Scottish policy developments and commitments in 
response to what both the SNP government and the Labour opposition perceived as injustices in 
the system. For example, a system of discretionary housing payments was established by the 
Scottish Government to mitigate the effects of the UK government’s ‘spare room subsidy’ 
(bedroom tax) imposed on those living in social housing in receipt of housing benefit. Following 
the termination and subsequent devolution (with a 10 per cent cut) of the UK Social Fund, the 
Scottish Government set up its own, more generous Scottish Welfare Fund to give grants to 
those in crisis or in need of community care. UK welfare reform may have further weakened the 
relationship between the welfare state and the nation-state, further undermining a conception of 
Britishness founded upon social welfare that had resonated in Scotland since the Second World 
War (Finlay, 1997), and had already been weakened during the Thatcher years. The bedroom tax 
and a punitive sanctions and benefits regime implemented by the UK government helped to 
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make welfare and ‘fairness’ central themes of the independence referendum campaign, enabling 
nationalists in particular to contrast the cuts and retrenchment in the new British welfare state 
with the promise of progressive welfare under independence.   
The Protagonists 
The social democratic case for independence has long been evident on the left of the SNP. 
While there was no significant ideological divergence between Deputy First Minister Nicola 
Sturgeon and First Minister and party leader Alex Salmond, he tended to place more emphasis 
on the claim that independence was necessary to achieving Scotland’s economic prosperity, 
whereas Sturgeon’s comfort zone lies in social policy and welfare. The welfare state – couched 
within the broad objective of creating a ‘fairer’ society – was one of the three themes which 
made the Scottish Government’s case for independence (alongside the democratic and economic 
case), set out in the White Paper, Scotland’s Future (Scottish Government, 2013h). The White 
Paper gave some pointers to what that fairer society might look like, but the details of the 
independent Scottish welfare state were left to an independent expert group appointed by the 
government. Chaired first by Darra Singh, formerly Chief Executive of Jobcentre Plus and the 
second Permanent Secretary of the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), then by Martyn 
Evans, Chief Executive of the Carnegie UK Trust, the expert group involved academics, senior 
public servants, business and third sector representatives. Its first report set out the transition to 
an independent welfare system, focusing on the bureaucratic challenges of transferring powers 
over social security from the UK to the Scottish Governments (Expert Group, 2013). Its final 
report presented a vision of an independent Scottish social security system which could be ‘fair, 
personal and simple’ (Expert Group, 2014).   
 The vision of a more progressive socially-just Scotland also lay at the heart of the case for 
independence across the broader Yes movement. Though much the smaller party within the Yes 
Scotland campaign, Scottish Green Party shared with the SNP a vision that independence could 
have a transformative effect on Scotland, including by creating a system of progressive taxation 
that would help to promote social justice, albeit one that promoted sustainability over economic 
prosperity, and decentralization and local empowerment over state control. Within the wider, 
more grassroots, movement, groups such as the Radical Independence Campaign, the Common 
Weal, the National Collective, Women for Independence and outlets like Bella Caledonia also 
campaigned for independence as a means to a more progressive future. They championed ‘hope 
over fear’, ‘the politics of sharing’ and ‘a Scotland of social justice’, articulating aspirations of 
preserving public services, eradicating poverty, income and gender inequality, and securing a 
redistributive welfare state (RIC, 2013; McGarry, 2013).  
 The No campaign was more fragmented when it came to the welfare theme. In spite of the 
post-war welfare consensus, the relationship between the nation-state and the welfare state has 
never been central to Conservative notions of Britishness, which instead rely on more traditional 
institutions and conventions of state. The potential of state welfare to promote solidarity across 
class and territorial groups has always been recognized and used more by the Labour Party. 
Long before devolution, Scottish Labour politicians traded Scottish political autonomy for 
access to the levers of power at the centre, with the promise that they could defend Scottish 
territorial interests and deliver the goods. After devolution, Labour maintained a commitment to 
a UK welfare vision, even promoting the NHS as a national symbol in spite of its growing 
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divergence under a system of multi-level government. It was the Labour Party, then, who 
championed a positive welfare case for union in the referendum campaign, one of the few areas 
where Labour could carve out a distinctive voice for itself in the Better Together campaign. 
However, it did so from a position of political weakness given the party’s opposition status in 
the Westminster and Holyrood parliaments and the dependence of the vision on a future Labour-
led government promoting UK welfare solidarity.  
 The No campaign was more united in talking up the risks that independence posed to 
pensions, benefits and social service provision. The UK Government’s Scotland Analysis paper 
on work and pensions (HM Government, 2014d) set out the scope and costs of existing social 
security provision for Scotland and the benefits of being part of UK-wide systems. It provided 
estimates of the costs of setting up new independent welfare bureaucracies and emphasized the 
increased financial burden that would face an independent Scottish Government in light of 
demographic projections and other cost pressures. As in other policy spheres, this risk analysis 
provided the basis for the more negative case for a No vote, enabling Better Together to focus 
on the costs and potential losses independence could generate for citizens in need. 
Framing the Debate 
Benford and Snow’s (2000: 615) categorization of the way political actors utilize frames to lend 
meaning to policy and political issues provides a useful lens through which to understand the 
way welfare issues were framed in the referendum debate. They drew a distinction between 
diagnostic framing, used to identify a problem and assign blame, prognostic framing, where 
campaigners offer an alternative to the perceived problem, and motivational framing intended to 
shape and motivate action in pursuit of campaign goals. Such framing was evident in the 
referendum among both the Yes and No campaigns, though in rather different ways. Only the 
Yes campaign perceived and represented the Union as the source of the problems facing the 
welfare state. Moreover, the welfare issue gave the Yes campaign an opportunity that was less 
evident in other parts of the campaign. UK government policies on welfare reform and 
retrenchment were used as symbols of all that was wrong with the Union, in contrast to an 
alternative, aspirational prognosis for welfare offered by an independent Scotland where social 
democracy could flourish. For No campaigners, independence presented a rather bleaker 
prognosis, in light of demographic trends and economic and social risks. The motivational 
appeal came in both negative exposure of risks, and a positive appeal to the sense of community 
and solidarity that allowed those risks to be pooled and shared across the UK.  
Four thematic areas highlight the ways in which both sides of the debate framed the issues 
of welfare. Each is discussed in turn below. For the most part, both campaigns talked past each 
other on welfare, appealing directly to the hearts and minds, aspirations and fears of the 
electorate. 
 
Independence and the Defence of the Welfare State 
From the outset, the coalition government’s welfare reforms were used both as a symbol of how 
the UK had moved ideologically from its own past and Scotland’s present, and a rationale for 
the powers of independence to restore and advance social justice. These themes were signalled 
7 
 
in the early stages of the campaign in the First Minister’s Hugo Young lecture, delivered in 
London in January 2012, when he suggested that: 
 
. . . anyone who accepted the Union partly because of the compassionate values and 
inclusive vision of the post-war welfare state may now be less keen on being part of a union 
whose government is in many respects eroding those values and destroying that vision . . . 
And looking at the problems of health reform now, I thank the heavens that Westminster’s 
writ no longer runs in Scotland on health issues. But the looming issues of welfare reform 
exemplify why Scotland needs the powers to make our own policies to meet our own needs 
and values (Salmond, 2012).  
 
 Such interventions highlight the twin challenges of welfare retrenchment and devolution 
confronting the traditional nation-building role of the welfare state. The critique is levelled both 
at British welfare institutions, deemed unable to embody social solidarity and represent shared 
British values, and at service provision. The British state was presented as no longer offering 
social protection, and the First Minister stressed a growing divergence between British and 
Scottish systems of social welfare.  
 Social justice was also a recurring theme of Nicola Sturgeon’s referendum campaign. In a 
speech in December 2012, she acknowledged that the creation of the post-war welfare state had 
been a defining feature of Britishness, but argued that the institutions that underpinned British 
distinctiveness ‘are under attack from the Westminster system of government’ which is ‘eroding 
the social fabric’ (Sturgeon, 2012). In March 2013, she spoke of the efforts that the Scottish 
Government was undertaking to mitigate the detrimental effects of UK welfare reform, but 
argued: ‘in order to deliver meaningful and long lasting change, and to deal effectively with an 
issue as complex as child poverty, with its many layers and its various causes and effects, we do 
need the levers currently reserved to Westminster to be returned to Scottish hands’ (Sturgeon, 
2013). Speaking to business leaders in March 2014, she highlighted ‘the need to protect the 
post-war welfare state’ as a core ambition of Scottish independence, arguing that ‘far from 
pooling risk and sharing resources, the current Westminster government is intent on nothing less 
than the dismantling of the social security system’ (Sturgeon, 2014a).  
 Framing the debate in this way diagnosed the constitutional status quo and the constraints of 
political union as the underlying problem. Devolved Scotland could take some steps to develop 
distinctive policies in those areas of welfare under its jurisdiction, but so long as Scotland 
remained within the United Kingdom, it could not fully escape the welfare retrenchment of the 
UK Government. From the perspective of the Yes campaign, independence offered a better, 
more progressive prognosis. Independence would give Scottish political institutions the tools to 
address Scotland’s social and economic problems, to preserve those elements of the British 
welfare state that Scots still hold dear, and to create a policy landscape reflective of Scottish 
values, which it is presumed are founded upon social democracy. These campaign themes also 
built upon an egalitarian myth that has deep roots in Scottish institutions and political discourse. 
The enduring belief that ‘we’re a’ Jock Tamson’s bairns’ (in spite of evidence of deep 
inequalities in the social structure) was central to the reframing of Scottish nationalism during 
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the Thatcher years (McCrone, 1996; Hearn, 2000; Morton, 2011), and coloured the discourse of 
Yes campaigners in the independence referendum.  
 The presentation of independence as a route to social justice was even more evident in the 
aspirations of the broader Yes movement. The Radical Independence Campaign (2013; see 
Figure 5.1) underlined the impact of welfare reform on the poorest communities in Scotland, 
and claimed that independence was an opportunity for radical social change. In the wake of 
George Osborne’s rejection of a currency union, they issued a ‘message to the victims of 
austerity’ and embarked upon a grassroots engagement strategy taking their message – and voter 
registration forms – to those poorer communities in urban Scotland where alienation is high and 
political participation low (Radical Independence Campaign, 2014). The left-wing think tank, 
the Common Weal, linked its support for independence to a comprehensive, universal and 
interventionist welfare state designed to support wealth redistribution, class and gender equality, 
constitutionally-enshrined socio-economic rights and the pursuit of social justice. The creative 
arts group, National Collective, presented an aspirational vision of an independent Scotland with 
the powers to create a ‘fairer, more compassionate welfare system’ (Figure 5.1) and used 
concerts, posters and twitter to mobilize the sympathetic and inspire optimism for a future under 
independence.1    
 
INSERT FIGURE 5.1 HERE 
 
 Within the official campaign, the possibilities of self-government, as well as the threats 
from union, were illustrated with reference to the NHS, which became an increasingly 
prominent theme in the final weeks of the campaign. Health care is fully devolved in Scotland, 
although funding has been dependent upon spending decisions in England and the Barnett 
consequentials this generates. In her final speech in parliament before the launch of the short 
campaign, Sturgeon claimed that protecting the NHS was ‘a fundamental reason for 
independence. So that cuts from Westminster don’t damage our NHS and instead we have the 
opportunity to decide for ourselves the resources we give to the NHS and other public services’ 
(Sturgeon, 2014b). The focus on the threats to the NHS was a departure from what had hitherto 
been a deliberately positive campaign, and a drift towards the negativity and language of risk 
more familiar to their opponents. From the summer of 2014, the Yes Scotland campaign website 
ran a page with a headline asserting that ‘A Yes means real gains for Scotland’s people – but it’s 
our NHS that will see the biggest cost if it’s a No’ (Yes Scotland, 2014). It went on to argue that: 
 
All of the Westminster parties are signed up to yet more swingeing austerity, sucking 
money out of Scotland’s budget and people’s pockets. Particularly at risk from a No is our 
NHS, where the privatization of the health service south of the Border could trigger cuts to 
Scotland’s budget. 
 
                                                          
1 For example, a #YesBecause hashtag, led by National Collective in the final days of the campaign, attracted 
101,238 tweets in 24 hours, and according to its coordinator, reached over 3 million people and was trending in 
Scotland, the UK and worldwide (Colquhoun, 2014). Many of the contributions expressed hopes of a better, more 
equal society.  
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The prominence of the threat to the NHS in the Yes campaign may seem surprising given that 
the UK parliament has no constitutional competence over health care in Scotland, and health 
spending in England had not declined so there were few adverse effects on fiscal transfers (see 
also the chapter by Lecca, McGregor and Swales). But the NHS has always had symbolic 
significance in the debate, and had itself been a symbol of Britishness. Presenting it as 
threatened by continued political union helped to reclaim the national in the National Health 
Service. The NHS was not the only devolved area at the heart of the Yes campaign. At the 
launch of the White Paper on Scotland’s Future, Nicola Sturgeon’s flagship policy commitment 
was to initiate a ‘transformational’ expansion in child care provision in the event of the SNP 
being elected to lead the first post-independence Scottish Government. Although this is wholly 
within the devolved sphere, the Scottish Government argued that only independence would 
enable this commitment to be financed through the increased tax take from an expanded female 
workforce. The policy was clearly also a naked attempt to make independence more appealing 
to women, given the gender gap in support for independence.   
 
An Appeal to the Social Union 
Whereas the campaign for a Scottish Parliament in the 1980s and 1990s had the social 
democratic terrain largely to itself, in the independence referendum, the Yes campaign had to 
compete for this space with the leading players within Better Together. The Labour Party 
included a vision of social solidarity embodied in the welfare state as central to a social 
democratic case for union. They appealed to social solidarity at the British scale, implicitly 
framing the UK nation-state as a UK welfare state, and defending the Union as, in Gordon 
Brown’s phrase ‘a Union of social justice’.  
 The nation-building impact of the welfare state can be traced back to the early post-war 
years, and the impact the post-war welfare state had in creating new cherished national 
institutions, protecting citizens against social and economic risk, and at least for two decades 
marginalizing the home rule issue in political mobilization and debate (Finlay, 1997; McEwen, 
2006). Its use in framing political discourse and explicitly presenting the UK as a social union is 
a more recent phenomenon, however, and largely an invention of Gordon Brown. He has been 
articulating the idea of the UK as a social union reflecting inter-regional solidarity since the 
onset of devolution (Brown and Alexander, 1999). These sentiments influenced the Commission 
on Scottish Devolution (Calman Commission) – set up in the wake of the SNP’s first election 
victory in 2007 by the opposition parties with the support of the UK government to review the 
existing devolution settlement – and justified its recommendation to retain social security as a 
responsibility of the UK parliament. In a speech in 2012, Brown set the tone for Labour’s 
referendum campaign in his defence of the ‘union of social justice’, supported by the spread of 
Scottish values across the UK: 
 
We have guaranteed that no matter whether you are Scottish, English, Welsh or Irish you 
will have not just the same political rights but the same economic and social rights – to 
health care, to the same level of child benefit, to minimum wage, and to pensions. We have 
guaranteed that when one part of the UK is in difficulty the rest of the UK will come to their 
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aid . . . In the last hundred years the union thanks to Scottish ideas of fairness and 
opportunity has become a union for social justice (Brown, 2012, italics added).  
 
The assumption of uniformity in health care was an exaggeration – even before devolution, there 
were some variations in the delivery of health care across the nations and regions of the UK. But 
the bigger problem was that such a discourse was being articulated against a backdrop of cuts to 
social security and fears of privatization in the NHS in England. It risked appearing nostalgic, 
potentially reinforcing the message of the Yes campaign that it spoke to a vision of the UK 
welfare state that no longer existed. For Labour, however, the diagnosis of the problem facing 
the UK welfare system was not political union but the Conservative-led coalition government. 
The solution was not to tear up three hundred years of union, but to vote for a Labour 
government at the next General Election.  
 These themes of cross-border social solidarity became a key feature of the Better Together 
campaign. One of its campaign documents, entitled a Sharing Union, appealed to a vision of 
social solidarity implicitly founded upon a shared sense of Britishness, and reflected a belief in 
the principle of social citizenship irrespective of where in the UK one lived (Better Together, 
2014a):  
 
The principled case for social union across the UK reflects our history. The welfare state 
was drawn together on the grounds that people across our country should have a minimum 
standard of living regardless of where they live. This is shown by the young person in 
work in London supporting the child benefit of someone growing up in poverty in 
Glasgow, and the revenues from oil receipts off the coast of Aberdeen supporting the 
person looking for work in Aberystwyth. We share with those across the UK a single 
system of unemployment assistance, a single old age pension, a uniform NHS, and more 
recently a common national minimum wage. These principles underpin our argument for 
the benefits of pooling resources across a wider community (italics added).  
 
Speaking to a third sector audience, Alistair Darling, Labour MP, former Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and chair of the Better Together campaign, underlined that pooling and sharing 
resources was a ‘fundamental part’ of the UK, and the best way to respond to social inequality: 
‘The United Kingdom is far more than an economic and political union; the social union is a 
fundamental part too and these three elements are what makes the UK what it is’ (cited in Third 
Force News, 20 February 2014). Gordon Brown, who assumed a more prominent role in the 
latter stages of the campaign, returned to these themes of shared social citizenship and the 
pooling of resources and sharing of risks it implied (see Brown, 2014a). In a powerful speech on 
the eve of the referendum, he invoked the shared sacrifices and a shared peace, embodying a 
shared solidarity across the nations of the UK: ‘The vote tomorrow is whether you want to break 
and sever every link and I say let’s keep our UK pension, let’s keep our UK pound, let’s keep 
our UK passport, let’s keep our UK welfare state.’ (Brown, 2014b) 
 Thus the Yes and No campaigns made similar appeals to social justice, but targeted them to 
distinctive communities of solidarity, one Scottish, and one in which Scottishness co-existed 
alongside and strengthened Britishness. They drew upon a similar set of social values, and a 
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similar set of assumptions about the egalitarian nature of Scottish values, but envisaged these as 
best reflected within different bounded communities. These were primarily sentiment-based, 
rather than fact-based, appeals to feelings of identity and belonging. These appeals were aimed 
directly at voters, and largely talked past each other. Only latterly did Brown explicitly try to 
counteract the framing of the Yes campaign, evidently concerned at its apparent impact on the 
referendum vote. In an article in Prospect Magazine, Brown criticized the tax and social policy 
commitments in the independence White Paper: 
 
One of the propaganda devices of the Scottish National Party has been to persuade left-of 
centre opinion that breaking free from London rule would create a ‘northern light’ for social 
justice . . . However, a Scotland which followed the policies outlined in the SNP’s white 
paper for independence and ended the system of pooling and sharing resources across the 
United Kingdom would quickly find that income and wealth would be more unequally 
distributed than in the country they abandoned.    
 
The Costs of the Welfare State Under Independence  
The social democratic case for union was mainly the preserve of the Labour Party and Better 
Together. While the UK government also reiterated the advantages for citizens and employers of 
a shared UK social security system, it was on more comfortable ground in framing the debate 
around the risks independence posed, including to the welfare state. From the perspective of the 
UK government, there was no welfare problem to diagnose, but the prognosis for welfare in an 
independent Scotland looked bleak. The Scotland Analysis paper on Work and Pensions, which 
like other outputs of the Scotland Analysis series sought to present a fact-based analysis and 
defence of the Union, claimed that ‘An independent Scottish state would face a more acute 
challenge than the UK as a whole, both in terms of demographic change, and its ability to absorb 
the impacts from a narrower tax base.’ (UK government, 2014: 10) The paper highlighted the 
increased relative costs of pensions and benefits resulting from demographic pressures, 
suggesting that Scotland was especially vulnerable because of it had proportionately fewer 
children (and therefore fewer workers in the future), fewer immigrants and a population that was 
consequently ageing faster. This was only partly corroborated by independent analysis. Parry 
(2014) pointed out that social protection spending per head in Scotland was now barely above 
the UK average (2 per cent with the gap narrowing), while demographic and economic 
projections resulting from migration, life expectancy, rates of disability and housing rents are 
too contestable and in any case have hitherto broadly balanced out revenue and spending 
disparities. Bell et al. noted that the disparity related more to relatively high spending on ill-
health related benefits such as Disability Living Allowance and Pension Credit rather than the 
state pension. Whilst Scotland’s population is expected to age more rapidly than that of the UK 
as a whole, the gap is projected to narrow again after 2032, and could in theory be offset 
partially or wholly by immigration were Scotland and the rest of the UK to pursue high and low 
immigration policies respectively (Bell et al., 2014).    
 Framing independence as the problem, and exposing the risks to social and economic 
security posed by a Yes vote, was also central to the broader Better Together campaign. Using – 
and arguably abusing – figures from the Institute of Fiscal Studies, Better Together highlighted 
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the risks associated with lower tax revenues and the set-up costs of a new welfare state. A 
pamphlet presenting a unionist case for the NHS noted: ‘The impartial experts at the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies (IFS) have shown that a separate Scotland would face between £3 billion and £10 
billion of cuts or tax increases . . . Some of these cuts would inevitably come out of our NHS 
budget. We don’t have to take such a big risk with our health service if we stay in the UK.’ 
(Better Together, 2014c)2 The Better Together pamphlet on social security similarly raised 
doubts about the affordability of pensions and benefits in an independent Scotland, given the 
level of deficit and demographic trends: ‘With so much doubt over what would happen to these 
payments, how they would be paid and who would pay for them, the only responsible choice in 
September is to vote to remain in the United Kingdom.’ (Better Together, 2014a)     
 
Welfare Bureaucracies and Cross-Border Cooperation  
As noted above, many of the pillars of the welfare state are already devolved to the Scottish 
Parliament, with institutional foundations that long predate devolution. Independence may have 
posed challenges and opportunities in maintaining, financing and expanding these, but there 
would be no new set-up costs. In social security, by contrast, the challenge of disentangling 
Scottish and UK entitlements and liabilities, and setting up a separate Scottish welfare 
bureaucracy, was acknowledged by both sides, although they differed on the scale and cost of 
the task.  
 For No campaigners, the costs of setting up new bureaucracies to deliver social security 
benefits (and to collect the tax revenues to fund them) added to the grim prognosis for welfare in 
an independent Scotland. The Scotland Analysis paper asserted that establishing a social 
security bureaucracy for an independent Scotland would require investment in a new IT system 
in the region of £3–400 million. In addition, it estimated operating costs of at least £720 million 
per year, and extra costs associated with developing, or procuring, relevant expertise to enhance 
policy-making and bureaucratic capacity, and to deliver and manage a large-scale welfare 
system. The paper also stressed the complexity and costs of disentangling Scottish and UK 
pension liabilities, disentangling and replacing other hitherto integrated tax and benefit systems, 
contracts and services, and negotiating ownership of, and access to, historical records of social 
security and tax claims (UK Government, 2014: 79-83). The emphasis was on the costs, risks 
and difficulties inherent in such a change, especially within the 18-month time scale that the 
Scottish Government had envisaged for the transition to independence. It assumed bureaucracies 
would have to be established from scratch, without factoring in the possibility of transferring 
ownership of existing Scotland-based DWP bureaucracies to the Scottish Government as part of 
independence negotiations.  
    The Scottish Government delegated the task of setting out a path towards transition to its 
Expert Group on Welfare. In its interim report, the expert group recommended that the Scottish 
                                                          
2 In fact, the IFS estimated Scotland’s net fiscal deficit in 2012–13 to have been 8.3 per cent of GDP, compared 
with 7.3 per cent for the UK, but in the year previously, Scotland had a relatively smaller net fiscal deficit. Using 
the OBR’s forecasts for the UK as a whole and assuming an independent Scotland would accept a population share 
of debt, they estimated that Scotland’s net fiscal deficit would decline to 2.9 per cent by 2018–19, assuming that the 
independent Scottish Government pursued austerity policies similar to those planned for the UK, putting it in a 
relatively worse position than the UK as a whole, which was projected to produce a net fiscal surplus of 0.2 per cent 
of GDP by 2018–19 (Amior et al, 2014). 
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and UK governments work together, in the spirit of the Edinburgh agreement, to deliver 
pensions and benefits on a shared arrangement basis for an unspecified transitional period, to 
minimize the disruptive impact for those dependent on benefits. The group also recognized the 
geographic interdependence in the current welfare bureaucracy. The bodies delivering public 
pensions and benefits are all under the control of the UK government, but they are scattered 
across the UK. Most – though not all – benefits applied for by Scots are processed in Scotland. 
These Scotland-based offices also provide this service to claimants in England. For example, the 
Child Maintenance Service, based in Falkirk, processes applications for the North East of 
England. DWP centres in Scotland deliver working age benefits for applicants in Yorkshire, the 
North West of England and London. The emphasis on continuity was intended to reassure 
citizens of a smooth transition to independence and there are clear advantages – in terms of 
continuity of service to those dependent on welfare benefits and job security for those who 
deliver them – to shared service agreements even after independence.  
Yet, the greater the interdependencies and continuities, the less scope there would be for 
doing things differently. At present the social security system is deeply integrated, with 
corporate functions and IT systems managed centrally. Service delivery is dependent upon an 
integrated payment and accounting system run by the UK Department for Work and Pensions. 
This core engine at the heart of the system calculates benefit entitlements based upon a UK 
policy framework. Such a system can accommodate relatively minor modifications, as in 
Northern Ireland, but in practical terms, it would be extremely difficult to share the 
administration and delivery of services in the context of markedly different entitlements north 
and south of the border. Sharing welfare bureaucracy may not have comfortably coincided with 
the social welfare aspirations of many independence advocates.  
 The UK Government’s Scotland Analysis paper also questioned the viability of shared 
systems after independence. It suggested that the UK Government would be unlikely to see such 
arrangements as beneficial to ‘the continuing UK’ and that they would be difficult to envisage in 
light of the rejection of a formal currency union by all UK parties, since the payment systems 
were based on Sterling. Where a negotiated agreement to share social security service delivery 
could be reached, the analysis paper insisted it would mean that an independent Scottish state 
‘would not be able to make changes to existing social security policy or processes or to opt out 
of Great Britain-wide reforms’ (UK Government, 2014: 79). Intriguingly, this pressure to 
conformity and uniformity is not emphasized by the UK Government in ongoing deliberations 
over the Scotland Bill 2015 on devolving more limited social security powers, although many of 
the arguments still hold. In the referendum context, the purpose was clear: expose the risks, 
emphasize the costs, and draw attention to the complexity of the task of disintegrating one 
system and creating another. The problem for the UK Government in the area of welfare, 
however, was that its own programme of cuts to benefits and tax credits meant that, for those 
favouring comprehensive social security and redistributive welfare, a vote to remain in the 
Union was not risk-free.         
 
 
Conclusion 
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In the independence referendum, voters were given conflicting messages of the implications of 
both independence and union for a social democratic welfare state, with one side talking up the 
promise and opportunities of independence and the other warning of its dire consequences. The 
Yes campaign capitalized on divergence in the welfare regimes north and south of the border 
since devolution, and the trajectory of UK welfare reform and retrenchment, to advance a social 
democratic case for a Yes vote. Threaded throughout the Yes campaign were three themes 
explicitly linking the past and future of the welfare state with the goal of independence. First, 
the UK welfare state could no longer reflect Scottish values or be trusted to provide social 
security to Scottish citizens, as evidenced in ongoing welfare reform. Second, the apparent 
direction of travel in the health service south of the border posed a threat to the devolved NHS 
in Scotland. And third, independence offered the prospect of a comprehensive welfare state that 
would reflect better the assumed needs and priorities of the Scottish people. For its part, the No 
campaign linked the welfare state and the defence of the union with both a defence and 
celebration of the ‘union of social justice’ and its embodiment of social solidarity on a UK scale, 
and a threat to the ability of an independent Scotland to maintain, let alone, expand social 
welfare provision. 
 The Risk and Constitutional Change survey, conducted by Delaney, Henderson and 
Liñeiraas part of the Centre on Constitutional Change research programme, suggests that the 
mixed messages were met at best with a mixed response, with limited evidence that they helped 
convert voters to either side (see Chapter 10). In particular, if the social democratic appeal and 
emphasis on welfare issues on the part of Yes campaigners was intended to appeal to women, in 
light of the gender gap in support for independence, there is little evidence to suggest that it 
succeeded. More men than women expected independence to lead to better care services for 
children, the elderly and people with disabilities just as more men than women supported 
Scottish independence. Nonetheless, even if this campaign discourse had only a limited direct 
impact in converting opinion toward the Yes vote, its motivational effects mattered. A vision of 
a progressive social democratic country, made possible by the powers and opportunities offered 
by constitutional independence, helped to motivate and mobilize the  grassroots Yes movement, 
perhaps reinforcing the social bases of support for independence.  
 There is little evidence, too, to suggest that the Gordon Brown and Better Together vision of 
a UK social union and UK social solidarity still has deep resonance in Scotland. Although a 
prominent theme among some key players, the social democratic case for union was not as 
central to the No campaign as was the social democratic case for independence. UK welfare 
reform and the UK Government’s austerity programme gave these claims a nostalgic air, 
potentially reinforcing the claims of Yes campaigners that progressive welfare at the UK scale 
was a thing of the past. There is strong evidence from the aforementioned survey and many 
others suggesting that Scots believe the Scottish Parliament should control all areas of the 
welfare state, even if they don’t necessarily believe this should lead to a markedly distinctive set 
of entitlements. In the referendum campaign, however, the core message of the UK Government 
and Better Together campaigners revolved around the risks to social security and the welfare 
state, alongside the broader set of risks and uncertainties associated with independence, and 
these may have contributed to the general unease among No voters at the consequences of a Yes 
vote.  
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